The Report of the Ministry of Finance Submitted in 2013 to the Parliamentary Investigation Commission Led by Oleg Reidman
… It happened in 2005. An old colleague of mine asked for my advice about a note written by an Advisor to the President. He suggested that I get a look at it. My advice was for him to resign. He was squeezed out later. The note included a description of what was going to happen to Moldova – its conversion into a money laundering haven for the money ‘wandering the world’.
… In 2011 I realized that the State interests in BEM were being threatened to an unprecedented extent, in an unprecedentedly insolent manner. I responded hard. February – June 2012 was crucial for setting the scene for what was to happen later, in 2013-2014. It did not concern just BEM. NBM’s fatal decisions and the lack of prompt response by state authorities deprived us of ‘success stories’. Others just surrendered. They claimed that what they had been saying about the raider attack were just political statements.
… April 7, 2012 came… And so came the foreigner with an almost German name (related to the Governor’s family) who agreed to represent the interests of some groups of ‘new shareholders’ at BEM in their communication with decision makers. In five days, on April 12, he became a member of BEM Administration Board and on April 13 he staged a great show, a bright reminder of what was happening back in the nineties. The ‘new shareholders’ were legalized by NBM in violation of law and of the decisions of the National Committee for Financial Stability. At that time, they also decided that Negruta was an obstacle for carrying out the raider attack and he needed to be distracted with something, for instance a lawsuit [against him].
… There also was the speech in Parliament and the correspondence with the Supreme Security Council (in April and June 2012). Certain decision makers were waiting for news to learn more about the BEM case, acting as audience. However, the news failed to amplify or at least admit as truthful the statements of a minister, even if they were made loudly and publicly.
… Then 2013 followed. The Reidman Commission investigation happened. And they hid whatever needed concealing. And they made the decisions that could not have been made by a Parliament of a sovereign state, with a Constitution enshrining the check and balances system.
… Many other things happened. And then came the Kroll report. It was developed based on selected data provided by NBM. Still, Kroll managed to do a great job using the scarce evidence they had. The Kroll report confirms that BEM – which had at end-2012 NPLs amounting to MDL 1.3 billion – was cleaned up in March and October 2013, getting rid of bad debt and bad loans through debt assignment agreements amounting exactly to MDL 1.3 billion.  So, in 2013 BEM was prepared for other ‘great projects’; probably, they were the ones that followed after the state gave away the majority stake in 2013.
For the sake of a better understanding of the events preceding the events described in the Kroll report, but also for letting everyone who is interested analyze why I was charged in a politically motivated lawsuit orchestrated at the orders of interest groups well hidden within several [political] parties, which was a performance staged by directors and script writers, and other elements, I believe that the day has come when I feel that I must publish the report submitted by the Ministry of Finance to the Reidman Investigation Commission. It will also help understand and clarify what is going to happen next in our political life.
I would say it from the start: if anyone feels like going to court after reading it, let them charge the Ministry of Finance. The reports submitted by the Ministry of Finance to the Reidman Commission in 2013 (part I) is a document submitted to state institutions, certain MPs (including the members of the Reidman Commission), former Prime Ministers, Advisors to the President and Prime Ministers, and others, and is still kept there (stuck somewhere in a safe or just hidden away so that nobody can see it). These papers show the official opinion of the Ministry of Finance until July 2013.
I hesitated whether to use in my court defense certain details that were directly related to BEM, as they still are classified. There will come the day when other elements will be added to complete the picture needed to understand the attitude of the oligarchs towards me. I hesitated, because November 28, 2013 [Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius] was important, and then I hesitated again because June 27, 2014 [the signing of the Association Agreement] was also important. People, including true journalists, know that.
If you observe some things you already know from recent reports, don’t be surprised.
If you observe that some confidential documents are included, [you should know that] they are not classified as state secret and their disclosure is legal. Those things are already known. At that time, I thought that they had to be mailed by secret post to make sure that they reach the addressee.
There is another day today…

1. BEM Cronologia – Sinteza (english here: 1-bem-cronologia-sinteza_ENG)

2. BEM Cronologie – Partea I – acesta e Raportul Minfin in comisia Reidman 2013

3. BEM Cronologie – Partea II (english here: 3-bem-cronologie-partea-ii_ENG)